Washington State Supreme Court Cases – week of 6/30/17

The Sate Supreme Court had four decision this week. The topics ranged from meal breaks, domestic violence orders, forfeiture of property without a conviction, and an appeal of a second degree murder conviction (also domestic violence related).

Jun. 29, 2017 – 93564-5 – Brady v. Autozone Stores, Inc.
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/?fa=opinions.disp&filename=935645MAJ

When a case is in federal court and there is a state law that is a part of the case that the federal courts feel has not been adequately resolved by the state courts, the federal court will turn to our court to get an answer (“certified questions”).

The first question was whether there could be strict liability for not providing a meal break. The court said no (and noted that neither party supported this position).

The second questions was about who carries the burden to prove that an employer did not permit an employee to take a break. The court held an employee can establish a prima facie case by providing they did not get a timely meal break and then the burden shifts to the employer to rebut.

Jun. 29, 2017 – 93645-5 – Rodriguez v. Zavala
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/?fa=opinions.disp&filename=936455MAJ

The issue in this case was about whether a parent could petition for a protection order for their child. The Supreme Court found the lower courts read the statute unnecessarily narrowly when it read the statute to preclude a parent from obtaining a protection order for their child. The Supreme Court found that the child should have been included in the protection order.

The Supreme Court also held that exposure to domstic violence is harmful under the Domestic Violence Protection Act. Referencing a prior decision, the court stated, “a child is psychologically harmed or placed in fear by observing violence against a family member.”

“Ample evidence supports the view that direct and indirect exposure to domestic violence is harmful….It strains common sense to think that L.Z. was not somehow exposed to domestic violence given the facts of this case. ”

Based on this, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the protection order.

Conclusion:

Zavala’s violent threats against L.Z. are “domestic violence” under the plain language ofRCW 26.50.010(3), and Rodriguez properly petitioned for a protection order on L.Z.’s behalf based on her reasonable fear for him. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals. We also conclude that exposure to domestic violence constitutes harm under the DVP A and qualifies as domestic violence under chapter 26.50 RCW. Because the trial court failed to consider the harm to L.Z. based on an incorrect reading of .010(3), it abused its discretion.

Jun. 29, 2017 – 93907-1 – City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/?fa=opinions.disp&filename=939071MAJ

Police are allowed to take property if it is connected to drug manufacturing or distribution (there is significant critique of this policy in discussion of criminal justice reform).For law nerd, RCW 69.50.505. The court noted the case is highly fact-specific. In discussing the law, “the court stated the statute generally does not contemplate forfeiture where the only violation is mere possession of a controlled substance; the violation usually must involve drug manufacturing or transactions.”

The “seizing law enforcement agency” (the City in this case) bears the burden “to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.” The court noted that there is a difference between the federal and state statutes.

Furthermore, the briefing from both parties appears to assume that forfeiture is allowed pursuant to RCW 69.50.505(1)(g) for personal property if the property is “traced as the proceeds of illegal drug activity.” Pet. for Review at 1 O; see also Answer in Opp ‘n to Pet. for Review at 6. While this assumption may be appropriate as applied to the federal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), it is inconsistent with the plain language of Washington’s statute, which allows forfeiture of personal property that was “acquired in whole or in part with proceeds traceable to an exchange or series of exchanges in violation of this chapter,” RCW 69.50.505(1)(g) (emphasis added).

 

CONCLUSION
Even where the question is limited to whether substantial evidence supports a finding by a mere preponderance of the evidence, appellate review must be sufficiently robust to ensure that an order of forfeiture is in fact supported by substantial evidence so as not to deprive people of significant property rights except as authorized by law. This is particularly important in the forfeiture context because an individual may lose valuable property even where no drug crime has actually been committed, and because the government has a strong financial incentive to seek forfeiture because the seizing law enforcement agency is entitled

to keep or sell most forfeited property. RCW 69.50.505(7).

 

Jun. 22, 2017 – 92816-9 – In re Pers. Restraint of Lui
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/?fa=opinions.disp&filename=928169MAJ

Petitioner Sione P. Lui challenges his conviction for the second degree murder of his fiancee, Elaina Boussiacos.  The Court of Appeals dismissed each claim as meritless and the Supreme Court affirmed.

The court rejected the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and related prosecutorial misconduct claims. The court walked through the various claims and analyzed each one concluded there was no basis for the claim. The court rejected the Brady violation claim, the juror misconduct claim, and the newly discovered DNA evidence (there was blood the gearshift the jury new did not belong to the defendant and they later matched the blood).

Conclusion

We affirm the Court of Appeals’s denial of Lui’s claims and dismissal of his personal restraint petition. Lui is not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or newly discovered evidence. Nor is he entitled to a reference hearing to determine whether counsel was sleeping at trial or whether the State withheld exculpatory or impeachment Brady evidence, or to prove his juror misconduct claim.